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Abstract
We consider a bilevel problem involving two monotone equilibrium bifunctions and we show that this
problem can be solved by a proximal point method with generalized proximal distances. We propose
a framework for the convergence analysis of the sequences generated by the algorithm. This class of
problems is very interesting because it covers mathematical programs and optimization problems under
equilibrium constraints. As an application, we consider the problem of the stability and change dynamics
of task’s allocation in a hierarchical organization.
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21 Introduction
Consider the problem of the stability and change dynamics of task’s allocation in a hierarchical organization.
This is, among others, a crucial point for the dynamics of organizations in Economics and Management
Sciences. At a higher level, there is a large literature about stays and changes dynamics, starting with the
work in Economics presented by Schumpeter in [1, 2], and in Management Sciences by Nelson and Winter
in [3], within an evolutionary perspective inspired by the theory of evolution in biology. These dynamics
abound (see, for example, Leana and Barry [4]). At the organizational level, they said “. . . organizations and
individual employees increasingly are pursuing change in how work is organized, how it is managed and in
who is carrying it out. At the same time, there are numerous individual, organizational, and societal forces
promoting stability in work and employment relations”. In this article, the authors examine “change and
stability and the forces pushing individuals and organizations to pursue both” and “some level of tension
between stability and change is an inevitable part of organizational life. . . ”. To hope to solve this very
important problem for the survival and dynamic efficiency of organizations, the most important step is to
embed this problem in a larger one. We give an answer to this dynamic task’s allocation problem in the
following way: we propose first a simple model of task’s allocation in a hierarchical organization. Then,
we use a recent Variational rationality approach presented by Soubeyran in [5, 6] as a required enlarged
framework which modelizes and unifies a lot of worthwhile stability and change dynamics which end in
variational traps.
At the mathematical level, given a nonempty subset K of Rn and f, h : K × K → R two bifunctions
satisfying the property f(x, x) = 0, h(x, x) = 0, x ∈ K, the present paper considers the following bilevel
equilibrium problem:
(BEP) find x¯ ∈ S(f,K) such that h(x¯, y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ S(f,K), (1.1)
3where S(f,K) = {u ∈ K : f(u, y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K}. In Behavioral Sciences, this means that a leader of an
organization can choose, among all of them, an equilibrium x¯ ∈ S(f,K), which is preferred by his followers
to all his other equilibria, i.e., such that h(x¯, y) ≥ 0, y ∈ S(f,K). This defines a hierarchical equilibrium,
a stability issue where the leader and all his followers prefer to stay than to move (a hierarchical stability
condition).
The bilevel equilibrium problem BEP has been widely studied and is a very active field of research. One
of the motivations is that it covers optimization problems and mathematical programs with equilibrium
constraints. These problems were addressed by Luo et al. in [7] and Migdalas et al. in [8]. Bilevel problems
have first been formalized as optimization problems in the early 1970s by Bracken and McGill in [9].
In the linear setting, some authors have presented iterative processes to approximate a solution of Bilevel
problems. Cabot in [10] built an algorithm which is able to minimize hierarchically several functions over
their successive argmin sets. Moudafi in [11] presented a proximal method for a class of monotone BEPs.
More recently, Ding in [12] used the auxiliary problem principle to BEPs. In this paper, under the hypothesis
of monotonicity, we present a proximal algorithm with generalized distances for BEP. One of the reasons for
using generalized distances instead of Euclidean norms is that the calculations and equations can be greatly
simplified by an appropriate choice of a generalized distance that allows us to explore the geometry of the
constraints. A broad explanation about generalized proximal distances is given by Auslender and Teboulle
in [13], Burachik and Dutta [14] and references therein. We point out that our algorithm retrieves and
generalizes the proximal point method for bilevel equilibrium problems presented in [11].
The organization of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present some notions of worthwhile stay and
change dynamics of task’s allocation within an organization and give some elementary facts on generalized
distances needed for reading this paper. In Section 3, we present basic hypotheses for equilibrium problems.
In Section 4, we consider a generalized proximal distance as a regularization term. In Section 5, we consider
4a proximal point algorithm with generalized proximal distances to solve bilevel equilibrium problems, we
derived a convergence analysis and examine the problem of the stability and change dynamics of task’s
allocation in a hierarchical organization.
2 Worthwhile stay and change dynamics of task’s allocation within
an organization
Let us consider how, in a dynamical setting, a leader of a hierarchical firm can manage the allocation of
a given set of tasks between different workers to produce a final good whose quantity and quality can be
chosen, each period, in order to match better and better the consumer needs to finally ends in a mature
product. At this end, the entrepreneur stops to change the allocation of tasks, because it is not worthwhile
to innovate more. This is a typical problem of task’s allocation for an organization. A large literature exists
on this topic in Management Sciences. However, very few dynamically formalized models exist. A static
model is easy to give, using a leader-follower formulation as a bilevel equilibrium problem. What is really
difficult is to give a dynamic formulation. This have been done by Bento et al. in [15], using a recent
Variational rationality approach of stay and change dynamics (see [5, 6]) which unifies a lot of different
points of views related to stability and change dynamics in different disciplines (Psychology, Economics,
Management Sciences, Political Economy, Decision theory, Game theory, Artificial Intelligence, . . . ).
2.1 A static model of task’s allocation in a hierarchical organization
For a hierarchical organization with a leader l and several followers j ∈ J , where J is the set of followers,
there are two polar cases:
i) authority: the leader l chooses the collective action x = (xl, xJ) ∈ X , where X = X l ×XJ is the set
5of pairs of actions of the leader and the followers, where xl belonging to X l is the action of the leader
and xJ belonging to XJ is the profile of actions of the followers.
ii) delegation: the leader l chooses first action xl ∈ X l and the followers carry out the profile of actions
xJ =
{
xj : j ∈ J
}
∈ XJ in their interests, or best interests.
The subset of followers J can be chosen or not, depending of the model. In the first case, the size of the
firm is a choice variable as well as the allocation of tasks. Then, in a dynamic setting, the leader is allowed
to hire and to fire followers (other different formulations of an organization are presented by Bento and
Soubeyran in [16], Bao et al. in [17], and also in [5, 6]). This contrasts with this paper where the size J of
the firm is a given. The topic is only the allocation of tasks between the leader and all the given followers
as specialized skilled workers. Let I = {1, 2, .., i, .., n} be the list of different tasks available to the leader
and the followers. In this context, the action xj = (xji , i ∈ I) ∈ R
n
+ of agent j can be identified to the vector
of effort levels xji ≥ 0 this agent j spends in doing each task i ∈ I. The leader can choose the allocation of
tasks x = (xl, xJ ) ∈ X and the means m(x) = (ml(xl),mj(xj), j ∈ J) allowed to him and to each worker to
perform their different tasks. This allows him to choose the quantity q(x) and the quality s(x) of this final
good. The revenue of the entrepreneur is ϕ [q(x), s(x)]. His operational costs ρ [m(x)] + wJ (x) are the sum
of his costs ρ [m(x)] to acquire the required means m(x), and the sum of the wages wJ (x) = Σj∈J w
j(x)
paid to each employed worker j ∈ J . In this model, individual wages wj(x) depend of the profile x of efforts
of all workers (team incentives). Individual incentives wj(xj), j ∈ J, work as well (as a variant). Then, in a
given period, the profit of the entrepreneur is gl(x) = ϕ [q(x), s(x)] − ρ [m(x)] − wJ (x) ∈ R. The net payoff
of each skilled employed worker j ∈ J is gj(x) = wj(x)− δj(xj) where δj(xj) ≥ 0 is the disutility of effort for
worker j. Let gJ(x) = Σj∈Jg
j(x) = wJ (x)− δJ (x) be the sum of all the net payoffs of all different workers,
where δJ(x) = Σj∈J δ
j(xj) is their total disutility of efforts. The weighted payoff of the organization is
g(x) = εgl(x)+ gJ(x), where ε > 0 is the weight allowed to the profit of the leader. A famous example of an
6endogenous production function of quality is presented by Kremer in [18]. The bilevel equilibrium problem
defined in this paper requires authority (and full knowledge of the profile of efforts) for the leader l of an
organization, because he is allowed to choose the entire vector of efforts x = (xl, xJ ) ∈ X .
2.2 Variational rationality: how successions of worthwhile stays and changes
end in variational traps
The VR variational rationality approach exami-nes stability and change dynamics of human behaviors (see,
[5, 6]). It focuses the attention on three main concepts: worthwhile changes, worthwhile transitions, and
traps (aspiration points, stationary traps and variational traps). The definition and modelization of these
leading concepts requires to define a list of intermediary concepts. Each of them needs lengthy discussions
for suitable applications in different disciplines. Let us consider a general and unspecified formulation of the
VR approach given in [5, 6], which allows a lot of more specific formulations. Then, we will apply it to our
specific, but important, example.
Worthwhile temporary stays and change dynamics
The past, current and future periods are k, k + 1, k + 2. The universal space of actions is X . It represents
all possible past, present and future actions which can be discovered as time evolves. The past and current
actions are xk ∈ X and x = xk+1 ∈ X . The experience of the agent at the end of the past period k is ek ∈ E,
where E is the set of feasible experiences the agent can eventually acquire.
(a) Worthwhile stay and change transition. The VR approach, see [5, 6], modelizes a lot of behavioral
dynamics as a succession xk+1 ∈ Wek,ξk+1(x
k), k ∈ N, of worthwhile transitions entwining temporary
stays xk+1 = xk and changes xk+1 6= xk, ending in variational traps x∗ ∈ X (to be defined below).
An point x of the universal space X can be an action (doing), or a state (having, or being). For
7the agent, a change xk y xk+1 ∈ Wek,ξk+1(x
k) is worthwhile, when his ex ante motivation to change
Mek(x
k, xk+1) is sufficiently higher (more than a chosen satisficing level ξk+1 > 0) than his ex ante
resistance to change, Rek(x
k, xk+1). Then, it is worthwhile to change from xk to xk+1 iff
xk+1 ∈Wek,ξk+1(x
k)⇐⇒Mek(x
k, xk+1) ≥ ξk+1Rek(x
k, xk+1),
i.e.,
Mek(x
k, xk+1)/Rek(x
k, xk+1) ≥ ξk+1, x
k+1 6= xk,
where ξk+1 > 0 represents a satisficing (high enough) worthwhile to change ratio.
Motivation and resistance to change are two complex variational concepts which admit a lot of variants;
for details see [5, 6]). Motivation to change
Mek(x
k, xk+1) = Uek
[
Aek (x
k, xk+1)
]
is the utility Uek [·] of advantages to change, Aek(x
k, xk+1), while resistance to change
Rek(x
k, xk+1) = Dek
[
Iek(x
k, xk+1)
]
is the disutility Dek [·] of inconvenients to change Iek(x
k, xk+1). A worthwhile change is an acceptable
change which balances satisfactions and sacrifices, improvements and costs of improving, or desirability
and feasibility. The famous satisficing principle shown by Simon in [19] is a specific case of satisfactions
with no sacrifices (see [5, 6]). Marginal worthwhile changes refer to an “one step more” change, within
the current period.
(b) Worthwhile to change rather than to stay payoff. It is, in the current period k + 1,
∆ek,ξk+1(x
k, xk+1) =Mek(x
k, xk+1)− ξk+1Rek(x
k, xk+1).
Then, it is worthwhile to change from xk to xk+1 iff ∆ek,ξk+1(x
k, xk+1) ≥ 0. Let us note, for simplifi-
cation, xk = x, xk+1 = y, ek = e, and ξk+1 = ξ > 0.
8(c) Advantages to change. Let us consider the following VR concepts. The VR approach considers
three levels: the case of an agent, an organization and interrelated agents.
i) For an agent, let Ae = Ae(x, y) ∈ R be his advantage to change from x to y. If Ae(x, y) ≥ 0, this
agent has an advantage to change from x to y. If Ae(x, y) ≤ 0 he has a disadvantage to change
from x to y, i.e., a loss to change Fe(x, y) = −Ae(x, y) ≥ 0. Then, advantages to change and
loss functions are opposite. For example, in the separable case, if actions x and y generate the
to be improved payoffs g(x), g(y) ∈ R, there is an advantage to change from doing x to do y if
g(y) ≥ g(x), i.e., Ae(x, y) = g(y)− g(x) ≥ 0. There is a loss to change if g(y) ≤ g(x), i.e.,
Fe(x, y) = −Ae(x, y) = g(x)− g(y) ≥ 0.
Let f(x) be the to be decreased unsatisfied need of an agent, defined by f(x) = g − g(x) ≥ 0,
where g = sup {g(z), z ∈ X} < ∞ is the highest feasible payoff of the agent. Then, after having
done action x, this agent will have an advantage to change from x to y if f(x) − f(y) ≥ 0, i.e.,
Ae(x, y) ≥ 0. This means that his unsatisfied need will decrease, f(y) ≤ f(x);
ii) For a hierarchical organization with a leader and several followers, where x = (xl, xj , j ∈ J) and
y = (yl, yj , j ∈ J) are two collective actions, let gl(x), gl(y) and gj(x), gj(y), j ∈ J be the “to be
increased” payoffs of the leader and all the followers at x and y. Then, advantages to change of
the leader and all the followers are
Al(x, y) = gl(y)− gl(x) ≥ 0, and AJ(x, y) = Σj∈J
[
gj(y)− gj(x)
]
≥ 0,
when they are nonnegative. In the other hand they represent losses to change Al(x, y) ≤ 0
and AJ (x, y) ≤ 0 when they are negative or zero. Then, the joint advantage to change of the
organization is
Ae(x, y) = εA
l(x, y) +AJ(x, y),
9where ε > 0 is the weight allowed to the leader payoff;
iii) The case of interrelated agents (games) has be examined elsewhere.
(d) Inconvenients to change. For an agent, let
Ie(x, y) := Ce(x, y)− Ce(x, x) ≥ 0, (2.1)
be his inconvenients to change. It refers to the difference between his costs Ce(x, y) to be able to
change from having the capability to do action x one time more to having the capability to do action
y, and his costs to be able to stay, Ce(x, x) ≥ 0. For an organization with a leader l and a given
subset of followers J , the costs to be able to change for all the members of the organization are
Ce(x, y) = C
l
e(x, y) + Σj∈JC
j
e(x, y) ∈ R+. Then, the inconvenients to change of the organization are
the sum of the inconvenients to change of all members of this organization.
(e) Aspiration point. Given a worthwhile transition xk+1 ∈ Wek ,ξk+1(x
k), k ∈ N, x∗ ∈ X is a strong
aspiration point if x∗ ∈ We,kξk+1(x
k), k ∈ N. This means that, starting from any position of the
transition, it is worthwhile to directly reach this aspiration point. Aspiration points are weak if it
exists k0 ∈ N such that x∗ ∈Wek,ξk+1(x
k), k ≥ k0.
(f) Stationary trap. Given e∗ ∈ E and ξ∗ > 0, x
∗ ∈ X is a stationary trap if We∗,ξ∗(x
∗) = {x∗}. This
means that ∆e∗,ξ∗(x
∗, y) < 0 for all y 6= x∗.
(g) Variational trap. It is a point x∗ such that, starting from a given intial point x0 ∈ X, it exists a
path of worthwhile changes xk+1 ∈Wek ,ξk+1(x
k) which ends in x∗, i.e., such that, being there, it is not
worthwhile to move again, i.e., We∗,ξ∗(x
∗) = {x∗}. A variational trap is both an aspiration point and
a stationary trap.
(h) Variatonal rationality problem. Starting from x0 ∈ X, find when a given worthwhile transition
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xk+1 ∈ Wek ,ξk+1(x
k), k ∈ N, converges to a variational trap x∗ ∈ X . The sequence of satisficing
worthwhile to change ratio {ξk+1 > 0} can be given, ex ante, or chosen, in an adaptive way, each step.
(i) An habituation/routinization process: It is such that, step by step, gradually, the agent carries
out a more and more similar action. When a worthwhile to change process converges to a variational
trap, this variational formulation offers a model of trap as the end point of a path of worthwhile
temporary stays and changes.
2.3 From behavioral sciences notations to mathematics
In what follows, assuming that f and h are given as in the introduction of this paper, advantages to change
for the leader and all followers are given by: Ale(x, y) = −f(x, y) ≥ 0 and A
J
e (x, y) = −h(x, y) ≥ 0, while
their losses to change are F le(x, y) = f(x, y) ≥ 0 and F
J
e (x, y) = h(x, y) ≥ 0 when they are non negative.
The weighted advantages to change for the organization and its weighted losses to change are, respectively,
given by:
Ae(x, y) := − [εf(x, y) + h(x, y)] , Fe(x, y) := εf(x, y) + h(x, y). (2.2)
We consider a simple and linear motivation and resistance to change structure. In this case the utility of
advantages to change and the disutility of inconvenients to change are identical to advantages and inconve-
nients to change, Ue [Ae(x, y)] = Ae(x, y) and De [Ie(x, y)] = Ie(x, y). Then, the worthwhile to change payoff
of the organization is ∆e,λ(x, y) = Ae(x, y)−λIe(x, y) = −Le,λ(x, y), where Le,λ(x, y) = Fe(x, y)+λIe(x, y).
Next, we recall some definitions and results associated to the proximal distance and induced proximal
distance, useful in the remainder of the paper which have been handled in [13, Definition 2.1 and 2.2] and
[14].
Definition 2.1. A function d : Rn × Rn → R+ ∪ {∞} is called a proximal distance with respect to a closed
11
nonempty convex set S ⊂ Rn iff for every fixed y ∈ intS, the following properties hold:
(i) d(·, y) is a proper, lsc convex function and C1 on intS;
(ii) domd(·, y) ⊂ S, and dom ∂1d(·, y) = intS, where ∂1d(·, y) denotes the classical subgradient map of the
function d(·, y) with respect to the first variable.
The family of functions satisfying this definition is denoted here by D(S).
Next step is to associate each given d ∈ D(S) with a corresponding proximal distance satisfying some
desirable properties.
Definition 2.2. Given d ∈ D(S). Let D : Rn×Rn → R+∪{∞} be a function such that intS×intS ⊆ domD.
D is called the induced proximal distance to d iff the following properties hold:
(H1) For every x ∈ intS, D(x, ·) is continuous on intS;
(H2) D(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ intS;
(H3) For all x ∈ S and α ∈ R, the set {y ∈ intS : D(x, y) ≤ α} is bounded;
(H4) For every x, y ∈ intS, it holds that
〈z − x,∇1d(x, y)〉 ≤ D(z, y)−D(z, x)− γD(x, y)
for all z ∈ S and some fixed γ > 0;
(H5) If {yk} ⊂ intS and yk → y ∈ S, then D(y, yk)→ 0;
(H6) Let z ∈ S and y ∈ intS, and take w := αz + (1− α)y, with α ∈ (0, 1). Then
D(z, w) +D(w, y) ≤ D(z, y).
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(H7) If {xk}, {yk} ⊂ intS are sequence such that {xk} converges to x and {yk} converges to y, with x 6= y,
then lim inf
k
D(xk, yk) > 0.
Remark 2.1. The conditions H1, H2, H3, H5 and H7 on generalized distances refer to more technical
assumptions. The conditions H4 and H6 are related to a weak form of the triangular inequality. The
triangular inequality is a standard assumption in the VR approach, (see [5, 6], for a strong justification).
We denote by F(S) the set of pairs (d,D) of proximal and induced proximal distances generalized that
satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.2, and we say that (d,D) is a proximal generalized pair associated
to S. In [13, Section 3] and [14, Section 4] the authors give several examples of proximal distances, for
instance; Bregman distances, a double regularization, or a second-order homogeneous proximal distances.
Remark 2.2. If x = y, it follows from property H4 that ∇1d(x, y) = 0.
Before stating the method, we recall two important facts regarding proximal distances generalized veri-
fying H6 and H7. The proofs of the following two propositions can be found in [14].
Proposition 2.1. Assume that (d,D) verifies H6 and H7. If {xk} ⊂ S and {yk} ⊂ int(S) are sequences
such that
lim
k→∞
D(xk, yk) = 0,
and one of the sequences ({xk} or {yk}) converges, then the other one also converges to the same limit.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that (d,D) verifies H6 and H7. If {xk} ⊂ S and {yk} ⊂ int(S) are sequences
such that
lim
k→∞
D(xk, yk) = 0,
and that one of the sequences ({xk} or {yk}) is bounded. Then the following hold:
(a) The other sequence is also bounded.
(b) limk→∞ (x
k − yk) = 0.
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Costs to be able to change
In this paper costs to be able to change from the current profile of efforts x = xk+1 to the future profile y,
given the experience e = xk of the agents, are given by
Ce(x, y) = 〈ce(x), y − x〉+ Ce(x, x), (2.3)
where Ce(x, x) is the cost to be able to stay, i.e., cost to be able to repeat the same current effort levels x
and 〈ce(x), y−x〉 is the marginal cost to be able to change which are costs to be able to increase or decrease
the current effort levels, from x to y− x. Note that, from (2.3), the inconvenient to change, defined in (2.1),
reduces
Ie(x, y) = 〈ce(x), y − x〉. (2.4)
Given the generalized distance d(xk, x) from the old profile of effort levels xk to the current one x = xk+1,
the marginal costs to be able to change are ck(x) = ∇d2(xk, x). We have reversed the mathematical notation
from ∇d1(x, xk) to ∇d2(xk, x) to emphasize that the move is from xk to x = xk+1. Generalized distances
are not symmetric, as required. They have regularity properties which are natural for costs to be able to
change. Furthermore, Ce(x, x) ≥ 0 are usually different from zero.
3 The standards assumptions for equilibrium bifunctions
Now, we pre-sent our basic assumptions associated to a given bifunction ψ : K × K → R and a proximal
generalized pair (d,D). We assume that K ⊂ int(dom d(·, y)) for all y ∈ int(S). For each x, y ∈ K given,
(L1) ψ(x, x) = 0;
(L2) ψ(·, y) : K −→ R is upper semicontinuous;
(L3) ψ(x, ·) : K −→ R is convex and lower semicontinuous.
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In addition to the previous hypotheses, we require the following properties for g:
(L4) ψ(x, y) + ψ(y, x) ≤ 0;
(L5) For any sequence {yn} ⊂ K with lim
n→∞
‖yn‖ =∞, there exist u ∈ K and n0 ∈ N such that
ψ(yn, u) ≤ 0, n ≥ n0.
The behavioral content of the standard assumptions, can be described as follows:
i) L1 represents that the advantages (or losses) to change from x to y are zero for any stay;
ii) L2 and L3 refer to regularity assumptions which are natural assumptions for advantages to change
function in the VR approach;
iii) L4 and two variants mean that if there is an advantage to change from x to y, there is a disadvantage
to change from y to x (a no regret condition);
iv) L5 means that for any unbounded sequence of actions {yn}, there exists an aspiration point u where
the agent wants to go, starting from any position yn, n ≥ n0. An aspiration points represents a major
concept in the VR approach which characterizes a variational trap as, both, an aspiration point (a
desirability condition) and a stationary trap (a stability condition).
Remark 3.1. Let us recall that Iusem and Sosa in [20] presented (L1)− (L5) hypotheses, in case where
d is an euclidean distance. Burachik and Kassay in [21] assumed these hypotheses by considering Bregman
distances.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that ψ satisfies Conditions (L1) − (L3) and K is compact. Then, S(ψ,K) is
nonempty.
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Proof. The proof is presented by Ky Fan in [22].
Theorem 3.2. Assume that ψ satisfies (L1)-(L4) and (L5). Then, S(ψ,K) is nonempty.
Proof. The proof is presented by Iusem et al. in [23, Theorem 4.3].
4 A generalized proximal distance as regularization
Let K ⊂ Rn be a closed and convex set and f, h : K ×K −→ R such that conditions (L1)− (L3) hold. Take
a generalized proximal distance d with respect to K and fix λ, ε > 0, x¯ ∈ int(S). Consider the bifunction
f¯ : K ×K → R defined by:
f¯(x, y) = εf(x, y) + h(x, y) +
1
λ
〈∇1d(x, x¯), y − x〉, (4.1)
where ∇1d(x, x¯) denote the gradient of d(., x¯) at x. We denote by S(f¯ , K) the solution set of the equilibrium
problem associated with f¯ .
Usually, mathematicians consider “to be decreased” payoffs (costs and unsatisfied needs minimization
problems). Behavioral Sciences consider, most of the time, “to be increased” payoffs (maximization, and
more generally, improvements of profits and utilities,. . .). The VR variational rationality approach follows
this Behavioral Sciences tradition. As seen previouly, VR advantages to change of the leader l and the subset
J of follower are Ale(x, y) = −f(x, y) ≥ 0 and A
J
e (x, y) = −h(x, y) ≥ 0, when such advantages to change
exist. This means that, using the mathematical notation, f(x, y) ≤ 0 and h(x, y) ≤ 0 modelize advantages
to change and f(x, y) ≥ 0 and h(x, y) ≥ 0 modelize losses to change. So, in terms of the weighted advantages
to change of the organization and inconvenient to change given, respectively, in (2.2) and (2.4) (with ce(x)
taken as being ∇1d(x, x¯)), the bifunction in (4.1) can be rewritten as follows:
f¯(x, y) = −Ae(x, y) +
1
λ
Ie(x, x¯). (4.2)
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The proof of the next lemma is similar to that presented in [21, Proposition 3.1].
Lemma 4.1. Fix x¯ ∈ K. Suppose that f, h satisfies conditions (L1) − (L4). Then f¯ satisfies conditions
(L1)− (L4). Moreover, if for every sequence {yn} ⊂ K such that limn→∞ ‖y
n‖ =∞, we have
L6 lim inf
n→∞
[
g(x¯, yn) + λ−1〈∇1d(y
n, x¯), yn − x¯〉
]
> 0,
where g = εf + h, then f¯ satisfies condition (L5).
Proof. It is clear that f¯ satisfies condition (L1). Since the maps
y 7→ 〈∇1d(x, x¯), y − x〉
is convex and continuous, and x 7→ 〈∇1d(x, x¯), y − x〉 continuous at x ∈ K, it follows that f¯ satisfies
Conditions (L2)− (L3). We claim now that f¯ satisfies condition (L4). Indeed, from monotonicity of g and
∇1d(·, z), we get
f¯(x, y) + f¯(y, x) = g(x, y) + g(y, x)− λ−1〈∇1d(y, x¯)−∇1d(x, x¯), y − x〉 ≤ 0.
Now, we show that f¯ satisfies condition (L5). From (L4) and (4.1), we have
f¯(yn, x¯) = g(yn, x¯) + λ−1〈∇1d(y
n, x¯), x¯− yn〉
≤ −[g(x¯, yn) + λ−1〈∇1d(y
n, x¯), yn − x¯〉].
From L6 there exists n0 such that the expression in parentheses is nonnegative for all n ≥ n0. This implies
that Condition (L5) holds for f¯ .
Corollary 4.1. If f, h satisfies conditions (L1)− (L3), and assuming either
(i) K is bounded, or
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(ii) ∇1d(·, x¯) is strongly monotone with modulus µ > 0, i.e.,
〈∇1d(y, x¯)−∇1d(x, x¯), y − x〉 ≥ µ‖y − x‖
2, x, y ∈ K;
then f¯ satisfies Condition (L5).
Proof. Using Lemma 4.1 it is enough to check that Condition L6 holds under (i) or (ii). Condition (i)
trivially implies Condition L6. Hence it is enough to prove that (ii) implies Condition L6. We claim that
Dom∂g(x¯, ·) ∩K 6= ∅, where g = εf + h. Indeed, the subdifferential of a proper, lower semicontinuous and
convex function is maximal monotone. If we extend the function g(x¯, ·) to the whole space Rn by defining
it as ∞ outside K, then we have that ∂g(x¯, ·) is maximal monotone. Thus Domg(x¯, ·) should be nonempty.
Since ∂g(x¯, z) = ∅ for every z /∈ K, it follows that Dom∂g(x¯, ·) ∩K 6= ∅ must holds. Hence the claim is true
and there exists v ∈ ∂g(x¯, x¯). Take a sequence {yn} ⊂ K such that ‖yn‖ → ∞, therefore we can write the
subgradient inequality
g(x¯, yn) ≥ g(x¯, x¯) + 〈v, yn − x¯〉 ≥ −‖v‖‖yn − x¯‖.
Altogether, we have
lim inf
n→∞
[
g(x¯, yn) + λ−1〈∇1d(y
n, x¯), yn − x¯〉
]
=
lim inf
n→∞
[
g(x¯, yn) + λ−1〈∇1d(x¯, x¯)−∇1d(y
n, x¯), x¯− yn〉
]
≥
lim inf
n→∞
[
−‖v‖‖yn − x¯‖+ µλ−1‖yn − x¯‖2
]
=∞,
and Condition L6 is established.
Next result establishes the existence and uniqueness of the solution of equilibrium problem associated
with f¯ . The proof is similar to presented in [21, Corollary 3.2].
Theorem 4.1. Under assumptions of Lemma 4.1. The following assertions hold:
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(i) If Condition L6 holds, then S(f¯ , K) is not empty;
(ii) ∇1d(·, x¯) is strictly monotone, then S(f¯ , K) has at most one element.
Altogether, if Condition L6 holds and ∇1d(·, x¯) is strictly monotone, then S(f¯ , K) has a unique element.
Proof. From Lemma 4.1 we have that f¯ satisfies Condition (L5). Using [23, Theorem 4.3], we obtain that
S(f¯ , K) is not empty. For proving (ii), assume that both x1, x2 ∈ S(f¯ , K). Hence
0 ≤ f¯(x1, x2) = g(x1, x2) + λ
−1〈∇1d(x1, x¯), x2 − x1〉,
and
0 ≤ f¯(x2, x1) = g(x2, x1) + λ
−1〈∇1d(x2, x¯), x1 − x2〉.
Adding last two inequalities, we get:
0 ≤ f¯(x1, x2) + f¯(x1, x2) ≤ −λ
−1〈∇1d(x1, x¯)−∇1d(x2, x¯), x1 − x2〉. (4.3)
Using the fact that ∇1d(·, x¯) is strictly monotone, it follows from (4.3) that x1 = x2 as asserted. The last
statement is a direct combination of (i) and (ii).
5 A generalized proximal distance as regularization method for
solving bilevel equilibrium problems
From now on, we assume that ∇1d(·, x¯) is strictly monotone, K ⊂ int(dom d(·, y)) for all y ∈ int(S) and
that all the hypotheses of Lemma 4.1 hold.
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5.1 Proximal point algorithm
In this section, following some ideas presented by Attouch et al. in [24] and Chbani and Riahi in [25],
we present an approach of the proximal point algorithm with generalized distances for bilevel equilibrium
problems, where the convergence result is obtained for bifunctions monotone.
From regularized problem (4.1) and existence and uniqueness of its solution (see Theorem 4.1), we
construct the following algorithm for solving the bilevel pro-blem (1.1). Take {ǫk} and {λk} two sequences
of positive real numbers such that
∑
∞
1 λk =∞, εk →∞ and λk ≥ θ > 0. Consider the bifunction
fk(x, y) = εkf(x, y) + h(x, y) +
1
λk
〈∇1d(x, x
k), y − x〉, x, y ∈ K, (5.1)
where f, h satisfies conditions (L1)− (L4)
Algorithm 1.
Initialization. Choose an initial point x0 ∈ K;
Iterative Step. Given xk, take as next iterate xk+1 ∈ K such that:
xk+1 ∈ S(fk,K). (5.2)
Stopping criterion. Given xk, if xk+1 = xk and xk ∈ S(f,K), STOP.
Remark 5.1.
(a) Notice that if h ≡ 0 in (5.1) it is sufficient to require, as a stopping criterion for the Algorithm 1, that
xk+1 = xk;
(b) If {xk} terminates after a finite number of iterations, then it terminates at a solution of (1.1). In-
deed, take k such that xk+1 = xk and xk ∈ S(f,K). From definition of xk+1 and fk, and since
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∇1d(xk+1, xk) = 0, we obtain:
εkf(x
k+1, y) + h(xk+1, y) ≥ 0, y ∈ K. (5.3)
Now, using that xk+1 = xk ∈ S(f,K) and f is monotone, it follows that f(y, xk+1) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ K.
Hence, f(xk+1, y) = 0, for all y ∈ S(f,K) and the statement follows from (5.3) for considering that
εk > 0;
(c) In term of the variational rationality approach, condition (5.2) is equivalent, each current period k+1,
to the existence of the variational trap xk+1. Indeed, combining definition of fk in (5.1) with definition
of S(fk,K) and using (4.2) with e = ek, ε = εk, λ = λk, we obtain x
k+1 ∈ S(fk,K) if only if
−fk(x, y) = Aek (x, y)− ξk+1Iek(x, y) = ∆ek,ξk+1 (x, y),
where ξk+1 = 1/λk. Then, it is not worthwhile to change from the current position x = x
k+1 to any
position y ∈ K iff
∆ek,ξk+1 (x, y) ≤ 0, y ∈ K.
This last condition defines a weak variational trap x = xk+1 in the current period k + 1.
Next, we introduce a technical result on nonnegative sequences of real numbers that will be needed in
the subsequence analysis.
Lemma 5.1. Let (ξk) and (γk) be nonnegative sequences of real numbers satisfying:
(a) ξk+1 ≤ ξk + γk;
(b)
∑
∞
k=0 γk <∞.
Then, the sequence {ξk} converges.
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Proof. The proof is presented by Polyak in [26, Lemma 9, p. 49].
In the sequel, given a nonempty, closed convex set Ω ⊂ Rn, we denote by δΩ, NΩ and σΩ, respectively,
the indicator function, the normal cone and the support function associate to Ω. Recall that:
δΩ(x) :=


0, if x ∈ Ω;
∞, if x /∈ Ω,
NΩ(x) :=


{q ∈ Rn : 〈q, y − x〉 ≤ 0, y ∈ Ω}, if x ∈ Ω;
∅, if x /∈ Ω,
and σΩ(x) = supy∈Ω〈x, y〉, δ
∗
Ω = σΩ (elements presented by Rockafellar in [27, Theorem 13.2, p. 114]),
∂δΩ(x) = NΩ(x) and, y ∈ NΩ(x) if and only if σΩ(y) = 〈y, x〉, where δ∗Ω denote the conjugate function of δΩ.
Let us define the functions fz(y) = f(z, y) and hz(y) = h(z, y), ∀y ∈ K.
Lemma 5.2. Assume that assumptions (L1)-(L4) hold for f and h, and take z ∈ S(f,K), w ∈ ∂
(
hz + δS(f,K)
)
(z)
and p ∈ NS(f,K)(z) such that w − p ∈ ∂hz(z). Then,
D(z, xk+1) +
λkεk
2
f(z, xk+1) ≤ D(z, xk)− γD(xk+1, xk) + λk〈w, z − x
k+1〉
+
λkεk
2
[
f∗z (
2p
εk
)− σS(f,K)(
2p
εk
)
]
.
Proof. From (5.1), assumption (H4) and monotonicity of f and h, we have
D(z, xk+1) +
1
2
λkεkf(z, x
k+1) ≤ D(z, xk)−
1
2
λkεkf(z, x
k+1)− λkh(z, x
k+1)− γD(xk+1, xk).
Since w − p ∈ ∂hz(z), it follows that h(z, xk+1) ≥ 〈w − p, xk+1 − z〉. Hence,
D(z, xk+1) +
1
2
λkεkf(z, x
k+1) ≤ D(z, xk)−
1
2
λkεkf(z, x
k+1)
+ λk〈w − p, z − x
k+1〉 − γD(xk+1, xk).
Rewriting the last inequality, we obtain
D(z, xk+1) +
λkεk
2
f(z, xk+1) ≤ D(z, xk)− γD(xk+1, xk) + λk〈w, z − x
k+1〉
+
λkεk
2
[
〈
2p
εk
, xk+1〉 − f(z, xk+1)− 〈
2p
εk
, z〉 − δS(f,K)(z)
]
.
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Since z ∈ S(f,K), δS(f,K)(z) = 0. Moreover, we have:
(i) 2p
εk
∈ ∂δS(f,K)(z) = NS(f,K)(z), so δ
∗
S(f,K)(
2p
εk
) = σS(f,K)(
2p
εk
);
(ii) 〈2p
εk
, xk+1〉 − fz(xk+1) ≤ f∗z (
2p
εk
).
Therefore, the desired result follows by combining (i) and (ii) with last inequality.
Under notations of the Lemma 5.2, let us consider the following hypothesis:
(H) :
∞∑
k=1
λkεk
[
f∗z (q
k)− σS(f,K)(q
k)
]
<∞,
where z ∈ S(f,K) and
qk ∈ R(NS(f,K)) := {q ∈ R
n : ∃ p ∈ S(f,K),with q ∈ NS(f,K)(p)}.
Remark 5.2. The assumption: (H) is a geometric condition which is similar to what was introduced in
linear setting in [24] and appears in [25]. In [24], the authors showed that in case where fz(q) =
1
2dist(q,K)
2,
we have f∗z (q)− σK(q) =
1
2‖q‖
2, for all q ∈ Rn and so
(H)⇐⇒
∞∑
k=1
λk
εk
<∞.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that f, h satisfies (L1)-(L4), λk ≥ θ > 0 and S(f,K) 6= ∅. For all x
0 ∈ K, we have
the following:
(i) The sequence {xk} generated by Algorithm 1 is well defined;
(ii) If (H) holds, then for all z ∈ S(h, S(f,K)), the following hold:
(a) exist limk→∞D(z, x
k);
(b) The sequence {xk} is bounded;
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(c) limk→∞D(x
k+1, xk) = 0 and limk→∞(x
k+1 − xk) = 0.
(d)
∑
∞
k=1 λkεkf(z, x
k+1) <∞
Proof. Item (i) it follows from Theorem 4.1. For item (ii), take an arbitrary z ∈ S(h, S(f,K)), i.e., h(z, y) ≥ 0
for all y ∈ S(f,K). Hence,
z ∈ argminy∈S(f,K)hz(y)⇐⇒ 0 ∈ ∂(hz + δS(f,K))(z).
Taking w = 0 in Lemma 5.2, we have
D(z, xk+1) ≤ D(z, xk) +
1
2
λkεk
[
f∗z (
2p
εk
)− σS(f,K)(
2p
εk
)
]
. (5.4)
Since assumption (H) holds, by Lemma 5.1 there exists limk→∞D(z, xk). In particular, {D(z, xk)} is a
bounded set and by condition (H3), we conclude that the sequence {xk} is also bounded, it proves items
(a) and (b). From Lemma 5.2, we have
γD(xk+1, xk) ≤ −D(z, xk+1) +D(z, xk) +
1
2
λkεk
[
f∗z (
2p
εk
)− σS(f,K)(
2p
εk
)
]
.
Thus, limk→∞D(x
k+1, xk) = 0. The Proposition 2.2 implies that (xk+1 − xk) → 0 as k → ∞, it complete
the proof of (c). Again taking w = 0 in Lemma 5.2, we get
1
2
λkεkf(z, x
k+1) ≤ D(z, xk)−D(z, xk+1) +
1
2
λkεk
[
f∗z (
2p
εk
)− σS(f,K)(
2p
εk
)
]
.
Using item (a) and assumption (H), we conclude the proof of (d).
Lemma 5.3. Assume that f, h satisfies (L1)-(L4) and S(f,K) 6= ∅. Let {xk} be the sequence generated by
Algorithm 1. If xkj → x¯, then:
(a) xkj+1 → x¯;
(b) h(y, x¯) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ S(f,K);
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(c) x¯ ∈ S(f,K).
Proof. From triangular inequality, we have
‖xkj+1 − x¯‖ ≤ ‖xkj+1 − xkj‖+ ‖xkj − x¯‖.
Taking the limit as kj →∞, we prove item (a). It follows of (5.1) that
εkf(x
kj+1, y) + h(xkj+1, y) +
1
λk
〈∇1d(x
kj+1, xkj ), y − xkj+1〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K. (5.5)
Combinig the monotonicity of the bifunctions f and h with the last inequality, we get
h(y, xkj+1) ≤
1
λk
〈∇1d(x
kj+1, xkj ), y − xkj+1〉 ∀y ∈ S(f,K)
≤
1
λk
[
D(y, xkj )−D(y, xkj+1)− γD(xkj+1, xkj )
]
.
From last inequality, hypothesis (L3) and using that λk > 0, it follows
h(y, x¯) ≤ lim inf h(y, xkj+1) ≤ 0, ∀ y ∈ S(f,K).
Since εk →∞, from inequality (5.5) and hyphotesis (L2), we obtain
0 ≤ lim sup f(xkj+1, y) + lim sup
[
1
εk
h(xkj+1, y) +
1
λkεk
〈∇1d(x
kj+1, xkj ), y − xkj+1〉
]
≤ f(x¯, y),
for all y ∈ K. Therefore, x¯ ∈ S(f,K). Now, using (5.5) and that f(y, xkj+1) ≥ 0, y ∈ S(f,K), we get
0 ≤ h(xkj+1, y) +
1
λk
〈∇1d(x
kj+1, xkj ), y − xkj+1〉, y ∈ S(f,K).
Thus,
0 ≤ h(xkj+1, y) +
1
λk
[
D(y, xkj )−D(y, xkj+1)− γD(xkj+1, xkj )
]
, y ∈ S(f,K).
Hence,
0 ≤ lim sup
(
h(xkj+1, y) +
D(y, xkj )−D(y, xkj+1)− γD(xkj+1, xkj )
λk
)
≤ h(x¯, y)
for all y ∈ S(f,K).
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5.2 Convergence of a worthwhile stays and changes transition to a bilevel equi-
librium
Definition 5.1. A sequence
{
zk
}
⊂ Rn is said to be quasi-Feje´r convergent to a set U 6= ∅ with respect to
the proximal distance generalized (d,D), if there exists a non-negative summable sequence {γk} such that,
for each k ∈ N,
D(zk+1, u) ≤ D(zk, u) + γk, u ∈ U.
Next result is important to establish the convergence of the sequence generated by Algorithm 1.
Lemma 5.4. If
{
zk
}
⊂ Rn is quasi-Feje´r convergent to a set U 6= ∅ with respect to the proximal distance
generalized (d,D), then
{
zk
}
is bounded. If a cluster point z of
{
zk
}
belongs to U , then limk→∞ z
k = z.
Proof. The proof is presented by Iusem et al. in [28].
Let us show that the whole sequence
{
xk
}
converges to a solution of (1.1).
Theorem 5.2. Under assumptions of Theorem 5.1. The whole sequence {xk}, generated by Algorithm 1,
converges to a solution of (1.1).
Proof. From (5.4) and Lemma 5.1, we obtain that {xk} is quasi-Feje´r convergent to a set S(h, S(f,K)) 6= ∅
with respect to generalized proximal distance (d,D). Moreover there exists a cluster point x¯ of {xk} such
that x¯ ∈ S(h, S(f,K)). Thus, by Lemma 5.4, we concluded the proof.
5.2.1 The stability and change dynamics of hierarchical organizations
From the viewpoint behavioral, we have the following findings:
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a) Our application shows that a succession of worthwhile temporary stays and changes from a current
stationary trap to the next one converges to a bilevel equilibrium, for an organization which can change
(bargain), within some bounds, each period, its sharing rules εk > 0, ξk+1 = 1/λk between the leader
and workers VR advantages to change payoffs and their VR inconvenients to change;
b) Setting bounded sharing rules (which can change within bounds) allows convergence of the allocation
of tasks to a stable hierarchical weak variational trap. The striking point is that the formation of
habitual tasks can occur even in a non stationary environment. Each period, bargaining over payoffs
destabilizes the current weak variational trap, and the process goes on, until reaching, at the end, a
hierarchical (bilevel) equilibrium. However, each period, the allocation of tasks becomes more and
more similar, ending in a routinized allocation of tasks.
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